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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 93-744
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DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSA-
TION PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
PETITIONER v. GREENWICH COLLIERIES

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSA-
TION PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, PETITIONER v. MAHER
TERMINALS, INC., et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the third circuit
[June 20, 1994]

  Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
  In adjudicating benefits claims under the Black Lung
Benefits Act (BLBA), 83 Stat. 792, as amended, 30
U. S. C. 901 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. IV), and the
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA), 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. 901
et seq., the Department of Labor applies what it calls
the -true doubt- rule.  This rule essentially shifts the
burden of persuasion to the party opposing the benefits
claim-when the evidence is evenly balanced, the
benefits claimant wins.  This case presents the question
whether the rule is consistent with 7(c) of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA), which states that
-[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent
of a rule or order has the burden of proof.-  5 U. S. C.
556(d).

                               I
  We review two separate decisions of the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.  In one, Andrew Ondecko
applied for disability benefits under the BLBA after
working as a coal miner for 31 years.  The Administra-
tive Law Judge determined that Ondecko had pneumoco-
niosis (or black lung disease), that he was totally
disabled by the disease, and that the disease resulted
from coal mine employment.  In resolving the first two
issues, the Administrative Law Judge relied on the true
doubt rule.  In resolving the third, she relied on the
rebuttable presumption that a miner with pneumoconio-
sis who worked in the mines for at least 10 years
developed the disease because of his employment.  20
CFR 718.203(b) (1993).  The Department's Benefits
Review Board affirmed, concluding that the Administra-
tive Law Judge had considered all the evidence, had
found each side's evidence to be equally probative, and
had properly resolved the dispute in Ondecko's favor
under the true doubt rule.  The Court of Appeals
vacated the Board's decision, holding that the true doubt
rule is inconsistent with the Department's own regula-
tions under the BLBA, 718.403, as well as with Mullins
Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs, 484 U. S. 135 (1987).  990 F. 2d 730 (CA3
1993).
  In the other case, Michael Santoro suffered a work-
related back and neck injury while employed by respond-
ent Maher Terminals.  Within a few months Santoro
was diagnosed with nerve cancer, and he died shortly
thereafter.  His widow filed a claim under the LHWCA
alleging that the work injury had rendered her husband
disabled and caused his death.  After reviewing the
evidence for both sides, the Administrative Law Judge
found it equally probative and, relying on the true doubt
rule, awarded benefits to the claimant.  The Board
affirmed, finding no error in the Administrative Law
Judge's analysis or his application of the true doubt
rule.  The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
true doubt rule is inconsistent with 7(c) of the APA.
992 F. 2d 1277 (CA3 1993).  In so holding, the court
expressly disagreed with Freeman United Coal Mining
Co. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 988 F.
2d 706 (CA7 1993).  We granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict.  510 U. S. ___ (1994).

                              II
  As a threshold matter, we must decide whether 7(c)'s
burden of proof provision applies to adjudications under
the LHWCA and the BLBA.  Section 7(c) of the APA
applies -[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute,- and
the Department argues that the statutes at issue here
make clear that 7(c) does not apply.  We disagree.
  The Department points out that in conducting investi-
gations or hearings pursuant to the LHWCA, the -Board
shall not be bound by common law or statutory rules of
evidence or by technical or formal rules of procedure,
except as provided by this chapter.-  33 U. S. C. 923(a).
But the assignment of the burden of proof is a rule of
substantive law, American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510
U. S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 10), so it is unclear
whether this exception even applies.  More importantly,
923 by its terms applies -except as provided by this
chapter,- and the chapter provides that 7(c) does indeed
apply to the LHWCA.  33 U. S. C. 919(d)
(-[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter,
any hearing held under this chapter shall be conducted
in accordance with [the APA]-; 5 U. S. C. 554(c)(2).  We
do not lightly presume exemptions to the APA, Brownell
v. Tom We Shung, 352 U. S. 180, 185 (1956), and we do
not think 923 by its terms exempts the LHWCA from
7(c).
  The Department's argument under the BLBA fares no
better.  The BLBA also incorporates the APA (by
incorporating parts of the LHWCA), but it does so
-except as otherwise provided . . . by regulations of the
Secretary.-  30 U. S. C. 932(a).  The Department
argues that the following BLBA regulation so provides:
-In enacting [the BLBA], Congress intended that
claimants be given the benefit of all reasonable doubt as
to the existence of total or partial disability or death
due to pneumoconiosis.-  20 CFR 718.3(c) (1993).  But
we do not think this regulation can fairly be read as
authorizing the true doubt rule and rejecting the APA's
burden of proof provision.  Not only does the regulation
fail to mention the true doubt rule or 7(c), it does not
even mention the concept of burden shifting or burdens
of proof.  Accordingly-and assuming arguendo that the
Department has the authority to displace 7(c) through
regulation-this ambiguous regulation does not overcome
the presumption that these adjudications under the
BLBA are subject to 7(c)'s burden of proof provision.

                              III
  We turn now to the meaning of -burden of proof- as
used in 7(c).  Respondents contend that the Court of
Appeals was correct in reading -burden of proof- to
include the burden of persuasion.  The Department
disagrees, contending that -burden of proof- imposes
only the burden of production (i.e., the burden of going
forward with evidence).  The case turns on this dispute,
for if respondents are correct, the true doubt rule must
fall: because the true doubt rule places the burden of
persuasion on the party opposing the benefits award, it
would violate 7(c)'s requirement that the burden of
persuasion rest with the party seeking the award.

                               A
  Because the term -burden of proof- is nowhere defined
in the APA, our task is to construe it in accord with its
ordinary or natural meaning.  Smith v. United States,
508 U. S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at 5).  It is easier to
state this task than to accomplish it, for the meaning of
words may change over time, and many words have
several meanings even at a fixed point in time.  Victor
v. Nebraska, 511 U. S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at
10-11); see generally Cunningham, Levi, Green, &
Kaplan, Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 Yale L. J.
1561 (1994).  Here we must seek to ascertain the
ordinary meaning of -burden of proof- in 1946, the year
the APA was enacted.
  For many years the term -burden of proof- was
ambiguous, because the term was used to describe two
distinct concepts.  Burden of proof was frequently used
to refer to what we now call the burden of persua-
sion-the notion that if the evidence is evenly balanced,
the party that bears the burden of persuasion must lose.
But it was also used to refer to what we now call the
burden of production-a party's obligation to come
forward with evidence to support its claim.  See J.
Thayer, Evidence at the Common Law 355-384 (1898)
(detailing various uses of the term burden of proof
among 19th-century English and American courts).
  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was the
leading proponent of the view that burden of proof
should be limited to burden of persuasion.  In what
became an oft-cited case, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw
attempted to distinguish the burden of proof from the
burden of producing evidence.  Powers v. Russell, 30
Mass. 69 (1833).  According to the Massachusetts court,
-the party whose case requires the proof of [a] fact, has
all along the burden of proof.-  Id., at 76.  Though the
burden of proving the fact remains where it started,
once the party with this burden establishes a prima
facie case, the burden to -produce evidence- shifts. Ibid.
The only time the burden of proof-as opposed to the
burden to produce evidence-might shift is in the case
of affirmative defenses.  Id., at 77.  In the century after
Powers, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
continued to carefully distinguish between the burden of
proof and the burden of production.  See, e.g., Smith v.
Hill, 232 Mass. 188 (1919).
  Despite the efforts of the Massachusetts court, the
dual use of the term continued throughout the late 19th
and early 20th centuries.  See 4 J. Wigmore, Evidence
2486-2487, pp. 3524-3529 (1905); Thayer, supra, at
355; W. Elliott, Law of Evidence 129, pp. 184-185
(1904); Chamberlayne, Modern Law of Evidence 936,
pp. 1096-1098 (1911).  The ambiguity confounded the
treatise writers, who despaired over the -lamentable
ambiguity of phrase and confusion of terminology under
which our law has so long suffered.-  Wigmore, supra,
at 3521-3522.  The writers praised the -clear-thinking-
efforts of courts like the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, Chamberlayne, supra, at 1097, n. 3, and
agreed that the legal profession should endeavor to
clarify one of its most basic terms.  According to Thayer,
-[i]t seems impossible to approve a continuance of the
present state of things, under which such different ideas,
of great practical importance and of frequent application,
are indicated by this single ambiguous expression.-
Thayer, supra, at 384-385; see also Chamberlayne,
supra, at 1098.  To remedy this problem, writers
suggested that the term burden of proof be limited to
the concept of burden of persuasion, while some other
term-such as burden of proceeding or burden of
evidence-be used to refer to the concept of burden of
production.  Chamberlayne, supra, at 936; Elliott,
supra, at 185, n. 3.  Despite the efforts at clarification,
however, a dwindling number of courts continued to
obscure the distinction.  See Annot., 2 A. L. R. 1672
(1919) (noting that some courts still fail to properly
distinguish -between the burden of proof and the duty
of going forward with the evidence-).
  This Court tried to eliminate the ambiguity in the
term burden of proof when it adopted the Massachusetts
approach.  Hill v. Smith, 260 U. S. 592 (1923).  Justice
Holmes wrote for a unanimous Court that -it will not be
necessary to repeat the distinction, familiar in Massa-
chusetts since the time of Chief Justice Shaw, [Powers,
supra], and elaborated in the opinion below, between the
burden of proof and the necessity of producing evidence
to meet that already produced.  The distinction is now
very generally accepted, although often blurred by
careless speech.-  Id., at 594.
  In the two decades after Hill, our opinions consistently
distinguished between burden of proof, which we defined
as burden of persuasion, and an alternative concept,
which we increasingly referred to as the burden of
production or the burden of going forward with the
evidence.  See, e.g., Brosnan v. Brosnan, 263 U. S. 345,
349 (1923) (imposition of burden of proof imposes the
burden of persuasion, not simply the burden of establish-
ing a prima facie case); Radio Corp. of America v. Radio
Engineering Laboratories, Inc., 293 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1934)
(party who bears the burden of proof -bears a heavy
burden of persuasion-); Commercial Molasses Corp. v.
New York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U. S. 104, 111 (1941)
(party with the burden of proof bears the -burden of
persuasion,- though the opposing party may bear a
burden to -go forward with evidence-); Webre Steib Co.
v. Commissioner, 324 U. S. 164, 171 (1945) (claimant
bears a -burden of going forward with evidence . . . as
well as the burden of proof-) (emphasis added).  During
this period the Courts of Appeals also limited the
meaning of burden of proof to burden of persuasion, and
explicitly distinguished this concept from the burden of
production.
  The emerging consensus on a definition of burden of
proof was reflected in the evidence treatises of the
1930's and 1940's.  -The burden of proof is the obliga-
tion which rests on one of the parties to an action to
persuade the trier of the facts, generally the jury, of the
truth of a proposition which he has affirmatively
asserted by the pleadings.-  W. Richardson, Evidence
143 (6th ed. 1944); see also 1 B. Jones, Evidence in Civil
Cases 310 (4th ed. 1938) (-The modern authorities are
substantially agreed that, in its strict primary sense,
`burden of proof' signifies the duty or obligation of
establishing, in the mind of the trier of facts, conviction
on the ultimate issue-); J. McKelvey, Evidence 64 (4th
ed. 1932) (-[T]he proper meaning of [burden of proof]- is
-the duty of the person alleging the case to prove it,-
rather than -the duty of the one party or the other to
introduce evidence-).
  We interpret Congress' use of the term -burden of
proof- in light of this history, and presume Congress
intended the phrase to have the meaning generally
accepted in the legal community at the time of enact-
ment.  Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,
503 U. S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 8); Miles v. Apex
Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19, 32 (1990); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 696-698 (1979).
These principles lead us to conclude that the drafters of
the APA used the term -burden of proof- to mean the
burden of persuasion.  As we have explained, though the
term had once been ambiguous, that ambiguity had
largely been eliminated by the early twentieth century.
After Hill, courts and commentators almost unanimously
agreed that the definition was settled.  And Congress
indicated that it shared this settled understanding, when
in the Communications Act of 1934, it explicitly distin-
guished between the burden of proof and the burden of
production.  47 U. S. C. 309(e) and 312(d) (a party has
both the -burden of proceeding with the introduction of
evidence and the burden of proof-).  Accordingly, we
conclude that as of 1946 the ordinary meaning of burden
of proof was burden of persuasion, and we understand
the APA's unadorned reference to -burden of proof- to
refer to the burden of persuasion.

                               B
  We recognize that we have previously asserted the
contrary conclusion as to the meaning of burden of proof
in 7(c) of the APA.  In NLRB v. Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U. S. 393 (1983), we reviewed
the National Labor Relation Board's (NLRB) conclusion
that the employer had discharged the employee because
of the employee's protected union activity.  In such cases
the NLRB employed a burden shifting formula typical in
dual motive cases: the employee had the burden of
persuading the NLRB that antiunion animus contributed
to the employer's firing decision; the burden then shifted
to the employer to establish as an affirmative defense
that it would have fired the employee for permissible
reasons even if the employee had not been involved in
union activity.  Id., at 401-402.  The employer claimed
that the NLRB's burden shifting formula was inconsis-
tent with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), but
we upheld it as a reasonable construction of the NLRA.
Id., at 402-403.
  The employer in Transportation Management argued
that the NLRB's approach violated 7(c)'s burden of
proof provision, which the employer read as imposing
the burden of persuasion on the employee.  In a foot-
note, we summarily rejected this argument, concluding
that -[7(c)] . . . determines only the burden of going
forward, not the burden of persuasion. Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, [548 F. 2d 998, 1004,
1013-1015 (CADC 1976)].-  462 U. S., at 404, n. 7.  In
light of our discussion in Part II A above, we do not
think our cursory conclusion in the Transportation
Management footnote withstands scrutiny.  The central
issue in Transportation Management was whether the
NLRB's burden shifting approach was consistent with
the NLRA.  The parties and the amici in Transportation
Management treated the APA argument as an after-
thought, devoting only one or two sentences to the ques-
tion.  None of the briefs in the case attempted to
explain the ordinary meaning of the term.  Trans-
portation Management's cursory answer to an ancillary
and largely unbriefed question does not warrant the
same level of deference we typically give our precedents.
  Moreover, Transportation Management reached its
conclusion without referring to Steadman v. SEC, 450
U. S. 91 (1981), our principal decision interpreting the
meaning of 7(c).  In Steadman we considered what
standard of proof 7(c) required, and we held that the
proponent of a rule or order under 7(c) had to meet its
burden by a preponderance of the evidence, not by clear
and convincing evidence.  Though we did not explicitly
state that 7(c) imposes the burden of persuasion on the
party seeking the rule or order, our reasoning strongly
implied that this must be so.  We assumed that burden
of proof meant burden of persuasion when we said that
we had to decide -the degree of proof which must be
adduced by the proponent of a rule or order to carry its
burden of persuasion in an administrative proceeding.-
Id., at 95 (emphasis added).  More important, our
holding that the party with the burden of proof must
prove its case by a preponderance only makes sense if
the burden of proof means the burden of persuasion.  A
standard of proof, such as preponderance of the evi-
dence, can apply only to a burden of persuasion, not to
a burden of production.
  We do not slight the importance of adhering to prece-
dent, particularly in a case involving statutory interpre-
tation.  But here our precedents are in tension, and we
think our approach in Steadman makes more sense than
does the Transportation Management footnote.  And al-
though we reject Transportation Management's reading
of 7(c), the holding in that case remains intact.  The
NLRB's approach in Transportation Management is
consistent with 7(c) because the NLRB first required
the employee to persuade it that antiunion sentiment
contributed to the employer's decision.  Only then did
the NLRB place the burden of persuasion on the
employer as to its affirmative defense.

                               C
  In addition to the Transportation Management foot-
note, the Department relies on the Senate and House
Judiciary Committee Reports on the APA to support its
claim that burden of proof means only burden of
production.  See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA,
548 F. 2d, at 1014-1015 (accepting this argument), cited
in Transportation Management, supra, at 404, n. 7.  We
find this legislative history unavailing.  The Senate
Judiciary Committee Report on the APA states as
follows:
  -That the proponent of a rule or order has the burden
  of proof means not only that the party initiating the
  proceeding has the general burden of coming forward
  with a prima facie case but that other parties, who
  are proponents of some different result, also for that
  purpose have a burden to maintain.  Similarly the
  requirement that no sanction be imposed or rule or
  order be issued except upon evidence of the kind
  specified means that the proponents of a denial of
  relief must sustain such denial by that kind of
  evidence.  For example, credible and credited evidence
  submitted by the applicant for a license may not be
  ignored except upon the requisite kind and quality of
  contrary evidence.  No agency is authorized to stand
  mute and arbitrarily disbelieve credible evidence.
  Except as applicants for a license or other privilege
  may be required to come forward with a prima facie
  showing, no agency is entitled to presume that the
  conduct of any person or status of any enterprise is
  unlawful or improper.-  S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong.,
  1st Sess., 22 (1945).
  The House Judiciary Committee Report contains
identical language, along with the following:
  -In other words, this section means that every propo-
  nent of a rule or order or the denial thereof has the
  burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence
  therefor; and in determining applications for licenses
  or other relief any fact, conduct, or status so shown by
  credible and credited evidence must be accepted as
  true except as the contrary has been shown or such
  evidence has been rebutted or impeached by duly
  credited evidence or by facts officially noticed and
  stated.-  H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 36
  (1946).
  The Department argues that this legislative history
indicates congressional intent to impose a burden of
production on the proponent.  But even if that is so, it
does not mean that 7(c) is concerned only with impos-
ing a burden of production.  That Congress intended to
impose a burden of production does not mean that
Congress did not also intend to impose a burden of
persuasion.
  Moreover, these passages are subject to a natural
interpretation compatible with congressional intent to
impose a burden of persuasion on the party seeking an
order.  The primary purpose of these passages is not to
define or allocate the burden of proof.  The quoted
passages are primarily concerned with the burden placed
on the opponent in administrative hearings (-other
parties . . . have a burden to maintain-), particularly
where the opponent is the government.  The Committee
appeared concerned with those cases in which the
-proponent- seeks a license or other privilege from the
government, and in such cases did not want to allow the
agency -to stand mute and arbitrarily disbelieve credible
evidence.-  The Report makes clear that once the
licensee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the government to rebut it.  This is perfectly compati-
ble with a rule placing the burden of persuasion on the
applicant, because when the party with the burden of
persuasion establishes a prima facie case supported by
-credible and credited evidence,- it must either be
rebutted or accepted as true.
  The legislative history the Department relies on is
imprecise and only marginally relevant.  Congress chose
to use the term -burden of proof- in the text of the
statute, and given the substantial evidence that the
ordinary meaning of burden of proof was burden of
persuasion, this legislative history cannot carry the
day.

                               D
  In part due to Congress's recognition that claims such
as those involved here would be difficult to prove,
claimants in adjudications under these statutes benefit
from certain statutory presumptions easing their burden.
See 33 U. S. C. 920; 30 U. S. C. 921(c); Del Vecchio v.
Bowers, 296 U. S. 280, 286 (1935).  Similarly, the
Department's solicitude for benefits claimants is reflected
in the regulations adopting additional presumptions.
See 20 CFR 718.301-718.306 (1993); Mullins Coal, 484
U. S., at 158.  But with the true doubt rule the Depart-
ment attempts to go one step further.  In so doing, it
runs afoul of the APA, a statute designed -to introduce
greater uniformity of procedure and standardization of
administrative practice among the diverse agencies
whose customs had departed widely from each other.-
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 41 (1950).
That concern is directly implicated here, for under the
Department's reading each agency would be free to
decide who shall bear the burden of persuasion.
Accordingly, the Department cannot allocate the burden
of persuasion in a manner that conflicts with the APA.

                              IV
  Under the Department's true doubt rule, when the
evidence is evenly balanced the claimant wins.  Under
7(c), however, when the evidence is evenly balanced,
the benefits claimant must lose.  Accordingly, we hold
that the true doubt rule violates 7(c) of the APA.
  Because we decide this case on the basis of 7(c), we
need not address the Court of Appeals' holding in Green-
wich Collieries that the true doubt rule conflicts with
718.403 or with Mullins Coal, 484 U. S. 135.

                                                    Affirmed.